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Abstract
In this work the security of the rate-1 double block length hash functions, which based on a block cipher
with a block length of n-bit and a key length of 2n-bit, is reconsidered. Counter-examples and new attacks
are presented on this general class of double block length hash functions with rate 1, which disclose uncovered
flaws in the necessary conditions given by Satoh et al. and Hirose. Preimage and second preimage attacks are
presented on Hirose’s two examples which were left as an open problem. Therefore, although all the rate-1 hash
functions in this general class are failed to be optimally (second) preimage resistant, the necessary conditions
are refined for ensuring this general class of the rate-1 hash functions to be optimally secure against the collision
attack. In particular, two typical examples, which designed under the refined conditions, are proven to be
indifferentiable from the random oracle in the ideal cipher model. The security results are extended to a new
class of double block length hash functions with rate 1, where one block cipher used in the compression function
has the key length is equal to the block length, while the other is doubled.
Key words. Cryptanalysis, Block cipher, Hash construction, Double block length, Indifferentiability.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` is defined as a feasible algorithm which uniformly maps an
arbitrary length input to a fixed length output. The design of today’s cryptographic hash functions still follows
the Merkle-Damgard (MD) structure [6, 19], by iterating a compression function on the input message to realize a
domain extension transform. The hash function will be collision resistant if the underlying compression function is.
In practice, most of hash functions are either explicitly or implicitly composed from block ciphers. The advantage
of the block-cipher-based scheme is that one can conveniently choose an extensively studied block cipher (e.g.,
DES, IDEA, AES, etc) to construct the compression function, and also the latest cryptanalysis results on such a
block cipher can be used to avoid the potential weakness in the scheme. Discussions of hash functions constructed
from n-bit block ciphers are mainly divided into single block length (SBL) and double block length (DBL) hash
functions, where single and double are related to the output range of the block cipher used in the hash function.
The motivation of double block length is to combine two n-bit block ciphers for a sufficient output range for
collision resistance. One such algorithm is MDC-2, which was developed by Brachtl et al.[2] based on DES; and
its general construction to an arbitrary block cipher is included as a standard in ISO/IEC 10118-2. It is believed
that the complexities of (second) preimage and collision attacks on MDC-2 are about 23n/2 and 2n, respectively.
∗The first author acknowledges the financial support of SenterNovem for the ALwEN project, grant PNE07007. The second and last
authors are partially supported by NSFC under the grants 60573032, 90604036 and National 863 Projects 2007AA01Z456.
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A DBL hash function H is said to be optimally secure, if any adversary with non-negligible successful probability
must spend the computation costs no less than publicly-accepted upper bounds of brute force attacks, namely, the
complexities of (second) preimage and collision attacks on MD structure hash functions are about 22n and 2n, with
respect to the pigeonhole principle and the birthday paradox, respectively.
Although DBL hash function can extend the range for collision resistance, a consequent disadvantage is a
decrease in performance. The rate of a block-cipher-based hash function is defined as the number of n-bit message
blocks processed per encryption or decryption for the measurement of the efficiency. E.g., the rate of MDC-2
is only 1/2, which implies that MDC-2 is at least twice as slow as the underlying block cipher. To improve the
efficiency, many DBL hash functions with rate 1 had been proposed, such as [3, 10, 22, 27]. Unfortunately, some
critical results showed the fact that those proposed schemes unlikely achieve optimally secure. In [14], Knudsen et
al. presented the attacks on a large class of DBL hash functions with rate 1 such that the key length is equal to the
block length n-bit (FDBL-I for short). In particular, the attacks break the proposed schemes in [3, 10, 22]. Still,
many advanced block ciphers (e.g., AES, RC5, Blowfish, etc) support variants of the key length motivates renewed
interest in finding good ways to construct a secure and fast DBL hash function. Many instructive examples were
proposed recently, e.g., [9, 17, 20, 21]. But all these schemes are less than rate 1, which means they are not fast
enough.
In [25], Satoh et al. presented some attacks on a general class of DBL hash functions with rate 1 where the key
length as twice as the block length (FDBL-II for short), and broke the rate-1 scheme in [27]. In particular, Satoh et
al. described a necessary condition for the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally secure against preim-
age, second preimage and collision attacks. Recently in [8], Hirose gave a comment on Satoh et al.’s result[25] and
showed that there exists a missed case in their analysis. Based on this comment, two necessary conditions for the
rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally collision resistant are given by Hirose in [8]. Furthermore, two
examples are left in [8] as an open problem to make it clear whether they are optimally secure.
Our Contributions. Consider the security of the rate-1 double block length hash functions where the key length
is double to the block length, our contributions are three-folds. First, we present (second) preimage attacks on
Hirose’s two examples which are left as an open problem in [8]. Moreover, three counter-examples in FDBL-II are
designed to disclose that Hirose’s necessary conditions [8] for optimal collision resistance are still not precise. Sec-
ondly, based on these attacks and counter-examples, we formally analyze the security of the rate-1 hash functions
in FDBL-II, and find although all the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II are failed to be optimally (second) preimage
resistant, there exists a subclass of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II can be optimally collision resistant. The
necessary conditions for the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally collision resistant are refined by the
analysis. In particular, the indifferentiability analysis are given on two typical examples in FDBL-II that satisfy the
refined necessary conditions, which imply they are optimally collision resistant in the ideal cipher model. Finally,
the security results are extended to a new class of DBL hash functions with rate 1 (FDBL-III for short), where one
block cipher has the key length equal to the block length, while the other is doubled in the compression function.
The extended results show that all the rate-1 DBL hash functions in this general class (FDBL-III) are failed to be
optimally secure. Prior to this paper, there is no rigorous analysis on the examples which are proposed by Satoh et
al. [25] and Hirose [8] to ensure whether they are really optimally secure.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, definitions and the former results
on DBL hash functions with rate 1 are reviewed. In Section 3, two concrete attacks are presented on Hirose’s
two examples, then counter-examples are given to show the fact that Hirose’s two necessary conditions [8] for
optimal collision resistance are not precise. Attacks are presented on FDBL-II to obtain precise conditions towards
optimal security. Section 4 concludes the paper. Additionally, the indifferentiability analysis of typical examples
in FDBL-II are given in Appendix A. Appendix B describes an extended security result on FDBL-III.
2
2 Preliminaries
In this section, some necessary notions and definitions are reviewed for the analysis throughout the paper. Let the
symbol ⊕ be the bitwise exclusive OR. For binary sequences a and b, a||b denotes their concatenation. Let IV
be the initial value. For DBL hash functions, an arbitrary input message M can be looked as a concatenation of
the 2n-bit length blocks such that M = m1||m2|| · · · ||mt, where t = d|M |/2ne and mi = mi,1||mi,2, i ∈ {0, t}.
The function Rank(·) returns the rank of an input matrix. In this paper, length-padding on the last block of input
message is implicitly used to avoid some trivial attacks. The same terminology and abbreviations in different
definitions are the same meaning, except there are special claims in the context.
2.1 Block-Cipher-Based Hash Functions
Let κ, n, ` be numbers. A block cipher is a keyed function E : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. For each k ∈ {0, 1}κ,
the function Ek(·) = E(k, ·) denotes a permutation on {0, 1}n. If E is a block cipher then E−1 is its inverse,
where E−1k (y) = x such that Ek(x) = y. Let Bloc(κ, n) be the family of all block ciphers E : {0, 1}κ ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. A block-cipher-based hash function is a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` by implementing
E ∈ Bloc(κ, n) in the compression function of H . If ` = n, then H is called a single block length (SBL) hash
function, e.g., the PGV hash functions [23]. If ` = 2n, then H is called a double block length (DBL) hash function,
e.g., MDC-2 [2], Parallel-DM[10], and LOKI-DBH [3]. The rate is widely accepted to measure the efficiency of a
block-cipher-based hash function, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1 Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` be a hash function and E ∈ Bloc(κ, n) is a block cipher used in the
compression function of H . If the compression function performs T times encryption or decryption of E to process
totally ` bits long message block, the rate of the hash function H equals `T ·n .
Ideal Cipher Model. Ideal cipher model is a well-known model for the security analysis of block-cipher-based
hash functions, which is dating back to Shannon [26] and has been frequently used for the security analysis of
various hash functions [1, 9, 16, 23]. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` be a hash function and E ∈ Bloc(κ, n) be a block
cipher used in the compression function of H . Adversary A is given access to the encryption oracle E and the
decryption oracle E−1. The i-th query-response is defined as a four-tuple (σi, ki, xi, yi) where σi ∈ {1,−1}, ki ∈
{0, 1}κ and xi, yi ∈ {0, 1}n. If σi = 1 then A asks (ki, xi) and gets response yi = Eki(xi), otherwise he asks
(ki, yi) and gets response xi = E−1ki (yi). Since Ek(·) is a permutation on {0, 1}n, it holds that
Pr[Eki(xi) = yi] = Pr[E
−1
ki
(yi) = xi] =
1
2n
.
In the ideal cipher model, one measures the complexity of an attack, on which finding a collision, preimage or
second preimage, is based on the total number of encryptions and decryptions that the adversary asked. Generally,
all repetition queries will be ignored, namely, if A makes a query on Ek(x) and this returns y, then he will not
repeat the query or ask the inverse E−1k (y). Such trivial queries does not help anything at the view of the adversary.
The block cipher in this model is variously named “Shannon oracle model”, “Black-box model”, or “Ideal cipher
model”. Since the last name is more often called, it will be used throughout the paper.
2.2 Security Definitions
Now we recall the definitions for the security analysis of block-cipher-based hash functions.
Attacks on hash functions. For block-cipher-based hash functions, there are three standard attacks which are
called the collision attack, the preimage attack and the second preimage attack. A limitation is that the standard
attacks only consider the situation that initial value IV is fixed. The four extended attacks include the situation that
IV can be changed by the adversary.
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Definition 2 Let H : K ×M → Y be a family of hash functions where K ∈ {0, 1}κ,Y ∈ {0, 1}`. Let M be a
message belongs to message spaceM∈ {0, 1}∗. By considering whether IV is fixed or not, three standard attacks
and four extended attacks are defined as follows.
1. The preimage attack (Pre) is that given IV and h, find a message M such that h = H(IV,M).
2. The free-start preimage attack (fPre) is that given IV and h, find IV ′ and M such that h = H(IV ′,M).
3. The second preimage attack (Sec) is that given IV and a message M , find another message M ′ 6= M such
that H(IV,M) = H(IV,M ′).
4. The free-start second preimage attack (fSec) is that given IV and a message M , find IV ′ and another
message M ′ 6=M such that H(IV,M) = H(IV ′,M ′).
5. The collision attack (Coll) is that given an initial value IV , findM 6=M ′ such thatH(IV,M) = H(IV,M ′).
6. The semi-free-start collision attack (sfColl) is that find an initial value IV and two different messages
M,M ′ such that H(IV,M) = H(IV,M ′).
7. The free-start collision attack (fColl) is that find IV, IV ′ and messages M,M ′ such that (IV,M) 6=
(IV ′,M ′) but H(IV,M) = H(IV ′,M ′).
The above attacks are from [13]. Similar definitions can be found in [16]. Compare with the standard attacks,
the extended attacks are also meaningful since they support a complete examination on minimizing potential flaws
in a family of hash function. It is easy to see that the free-start and the semi-free-start attacks are never harder than
the attacks where IV is specified in advance. To rigorously analyze the security of a hash function at the presents
of adversary, a widely-accepted approach will be recalled in below.
Indifferentiability Model. Objects are considered to be computational equivalent if no polynomial-time procedure
can tell them apart. In [18], Maurer et al. first introduced the notion of indifferentiability, which is formalized to
“distinguish” whether a given object exists any computational inequivalent from a heuristic random oracle. The
indifferentiability has been focussed on the question: what conditions should be imposed on the compression
function F to ensure that the hash function CF satisfies the certain conditions of the random oracle. This approach
is based on the fact that one of the problems in assessing the security of a hash function is caused by domain
extension transform. It is clear that the weakness of F will generally result in weakness of CF , but the converse is
not true in general. The indifferentiability between a hash function and a random oracle is a more rigorous white-
box analysis which requires the examination of the internal structure of the hash function, while the traditional
instantiation just implements a black-box analysis.
Definition 3 A Turing machine C with oracle access to an ideal primitiveF is said to be (tD, tS , q, ²)-indifferentiable
from an ideal primitive Rand if there exists a simulator S, such that for any distinguisher D it holds the advantage
of indifferentiability that:
Adv(D) = |Pr[DC,F = 1]− Pr[DRand,S = 1]| < ²,
where S has oracle access to Rand and runs in polynomial time at most tS , andD runs in polynomial time at most
tD and makes at most q queries. CF is said to be indifferentiable from Rand if ² is a negligible function of the
security parameter k (in polynomial time tD and tS).
It is proven in [18] that if CF is indifferentiable from Rand, then CF can instantiate Rand in any cryptosystem
and the resulting cryptosystem is at least as secure in theF model as in theRand model. In the rest of the paper, the
Turing Machine C will denote the construction of an iterated hash function and the ideal primitive F will represent
the compression function of C.
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For block-cipher-based hash functions, the above definition needs to be slightly modified due to the underlying
compression function should be analyzed in the ideal cipher model [4, 7]. In other words, if a block-cipher-based
hash function CF is indifferentiable from a random oracle Rand in the ideal cipher model, then CF can replace
Rand in any cryptosystem, while keeping the resulting system (with CF ) to remain secure in the ideal cipher
model if the original system (with Rand) is secure in the random oracle model. Let E be the block cipher used
in the compression function and E−1 is its inverse. Simulator S has to simulate both E and E−1 because every
distinguisher D can access encryption and decryption oracles in the ideal cipher model. Therefore, distinguisher
D obtains the following rules: either the block cipher E,E−1 is chosen at random and the hash function H is
constructed from it, or the hash function H is chosen at random and the block cipher E,E−1 is implemented by a
simulator S with oracle access to H . Those two ways to build up a hash function should be indifferentiable.
Similarly, Hirose proposed the notion of indistinguishability on iterated hash functions in [9], which is weaker
than the notion of indifferentiability. It is easy to see that if a block-cipher-based hash function CE,E−1 is indif-
ferentiable from a random oracle in polynomial time bounds tS , tD with a negligible probability ², then it is also
indistinguishable in the same bound. For simplicity, one needs only to prove the indifferentiability instead of the
both.
Since hash function plays a pivotal role in the real-life cryptographic applications (e.g., data or entity authen-
tication, public-key encryption and digital signature), it is prudent to make a block-cipher-based hash function to
be optimally secure against all seven attacks for the security of the applications, and also be indifferentiable from a
random oracle in the ideal cipher model.
2.3 Results on Fast DBL Hash Functions
Here we briefly review the former results on the rate-1 DBL hash functions. By assuming the key length κ of
block cipher E ∈ Bloc(κ, n) used in the compression function is identical to the block length, Knudsen et al.
[14] presented attacks on this class of DBL hash functions with rate 1 (FDBL-I). The general form of this class is
described as follows. {
hi = EA(B)⊕ C,
gi = EX(Y )⊕ Z. (1)
For all rate-1 hash functions defined by (1), (A,B,C) are linear combinations of the n-bit vectors (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2),
(X,Y, Z) are linear combinations of the n-bit vectors (hi, hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2).
AB
C
 = (Ll Lr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 ,
XY
Z
 = (Rl Rr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
·

hi
hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 . (2)
If hi and gi can be computed independently, then the construction is called parallel, otherwise is called serial.
In [14], Knudsen et al. proved that all the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-I are failed to be optimally secure against
collision, preimage and second preimage attacks. The result is given by the following theorem in [14].
Theorem 1 For the rate-1 iterated hash function with the form (1) (FDBL-I), there exist preimage and second
preimage attacks with complexities of about 4 × 2n. Furthermore, there exists a collision attack with complexity
of about 3 × 23n/4. For all but two classes of the hash functions, there exists a collision attack with complexity of
about 4× 2n/2.
In AES algorithm, the key length can be 128,192,256-bit while the block length is 128-bit. This property
motivates interests in finding schemes to turn such a block cipher into a secure and fast DBL hash function, where
the key length are longer than the block length. By considering the block cipher E ∈ Bloc(κ, n) where κ = 2n,
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Satoh et al. [25] proposed a new family of the rate-1 DBL hash functions (FDBL-II), which is defined by the
general form as follows. {
hi = EA||B(C)⊕D,
gi = EW ||X(Y )⊕ Z. (3)
For all rate-1 hash functions defined by (3), both (A,B,C,D) and (W,X, Y, Z) are linear combinations of the
n-bit vectors (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2). Those linear combinations can be represented as
A
B
C
D
 = (Ll Lr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 ,

W
X
Y
Z
 = (Rl Rr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 , (4)
where Ll and Lr denote 4× 2 binary submatrices of L. Let Lil and Lir denote the 3× 2 submatrices of Ll and Lr
such that the i-th row of Ll and Lr are deleted, respectively. Matrix L is said to be “exceptional” if Rank(L) = 4
and Rank(L3r) = Rank(L
4
r) = 2.
In [25], Satoh et al. stated attacks on FDBL-II when the compression function does not satisfy the exceptional
property.
Theorem 2 For the rate-1 iterated hash function with the form (3)(FDBL-II), if L or R is not exceptional, there
exist preimage, second preimage and collision attacks with complexities of about 4 × 2n, 3 × 2n and 3 × 2n/2,
respectively.
In particular, Satoh et al. [25] presented attacks on a subclass of the rate-1 DBL hash functions in FDBL-II.
We stress that the proposed scheme in [27] is a paradigm with respect to this subclass.
Theorem 3 For a subclass of the rate-1 double block length hash functions in FDBL-II with the compression
function: {
hi = EA||B(C)⊕D,
gi = EA||B(C)⊕ F. (5)
where (A,B,C,D, F ) is linear combinations of (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2) andE ∈ Bloc(2n, n), there exist (second)
preimage and collision attacks with complexities of about 2× 2n and 2× 2n/2, respectively.
In [8], Hirose gave a comment on the analysis by Satoh et al. [25]. The comment shows there exist the rate-1
DBL hash functions in FDBL-II whose compression functions are not exceptional but still no meaningful collision
attacks can be found. For convincing of this comment, an example without the exceptional property was proposed
in [8] as follows.
HDBL-1: Let HDBL-1:{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2n be a double block length hash function and E ∈ Bloc(2n, n) is the
block cipher used in the compression function. The compression function has the following definition:{
hi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1 ⊕ gi−1)⊕ hi−1 ⊕ gi−1,
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi−1.
(6)

A
B
C
D
 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 ,

W
X
Y
Z
 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 (7)
Furthermore, the other example with the exceptional property was also proposed in [8].
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HDBL-2: Let HDBL-2:{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2n be a double block length hash function and E ∈ Bloc(2n, n) is the
block cipher used in the compression function. The compression function has the following definition:{
hi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ gi−1,
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(gi−1)⊕ hi−1.
(8)

A
B
C
D
 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 ,

W
X
Y
Z
 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
·

hi−1
gi−1
mi,1
mi,2
 (9)
Both HDBL-1 and HDBL-2 are the instances of FDBL-II. Let (a, b, c, d) and (w, x, y, z) be the values of
(A,B,C,D) and (W,X, Y, Z) that used in the computations of hi and gi, respectively. In [25], the adversary
chooses random triple (a, b, c) such that c = α · a ⊕ β · b where α, β ∈ {0, 1}, then computes d = Ea||b(c) ⊕ hi.
Hirose found if c = α · a⊕ β · b⊕ d, the adversary cannot compute d by Ea||b(c)⊕ hi. Therefore, besides both L
and R are exceptional, a new condition for the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally collision resistant
is defined by Hirose in [8].
Definition 4 For any rate-1 iterated hash function in FDBL-II, if it is optimally collision resistant, then it must be
in one of the two types:
1. Both L and R are exceptional,
2. Rank(L) = Rank(R) = 3, c⊕ d = λ1a⊕ λ2b and y ⊕ z = λ3w ⊕ λ4x, for some λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 ∈ {0, 1},
and the upper right 2× 2 submatrices of L and R are both non-singular.
In [8], Hirose claimed that the above conditions are not sufficient but just necessary for the property of optimal
collision resistance. It was left as an open problem if the two probably secure examples (HDBL-1 and HDBL-2)
are really optimally secure.
3 Security Analysis of FDBL-II
In this section, the security of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II is reconsidered. A synthetic analysis is presented
which exploits the fact that the former results [8, 25] on the security of FDBL-II are still inaccurate. First, two
concrete attacks are presented to prove that both HDBL-1 and HDBL-2 are failed to be optimally preimage and
second preimage resistant. Next, three counter-examples are described, which disclose Hirose’s conditions for
optimally collision resistant are failed in some uncovered cases. Finally, based on the examples and new attacks,
the necessary conditions for the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally secure are refined.
3.1 Attacks on Hirose’s Two Examples
In [25], Satoh et al. suggested that any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-II will not to be optimally secure, if its com-
pression function does not satisfy the exceptional property. Towards this approach, Hirose [8] gave a comment on
Satoh et al.’s result, and said there exist optimally collision resistant hash functions in FDBL-II whose compression
functions do not satisfy the exceptional property. Moreover, Hirose proposed two examples in FDBL-II (HDBL-1
and HDBL-2, described in Section 2.3) which are probably secure against the collision attack. HDBL-2 satisfies
the exceptional property while HDBL-1 does not, and both of them satisfy Hirose’s two necessary conditions in
Definition 4. Here we present two concrete attacks on Hirose’s two examples which prove they are both failed to
be optimally (second) preimage resistant.
7
Theorem 4 Let HDBL-1 be a hash function defined by the form (6),{
hi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1 ⊕ gi−1)⊕ hi−1 ⊕ gi−1,
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi−1,
then there exists a (second) preimage attack on the hash function with complexity of about 4× 23n/2.
Proof. By using the idea of the meet-in-the-middle attack [16], a preimage attack on the HDBL-1 hash function
proceeds as follows.
1. For the preimage attack on (hi, gi), an adversary A chooses arbitrary message M = m1||m2|| · · · ||mi−2,
and by computing the values of (hi−2, gi−2) iteratively from the initial value IV = h0||g0.
2. Forward step:
(a) A tries 2n operations to find a pair (mi, c) where hi = Emi(c)⊕ c = Emi,1||mi,2(c)⊕ c.
(b) A chooses 2n values of hi−1 where c = hi−1 ⊕ gi−1. Due to the pigeonhole principle, A can find a
value of hi−1 satisfies gi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi−1.
(c) A repeats q1 times of the forward step to obtain q1 values of (mi,1,mi,2, hi−1, gi−1).
3. Backward step: A chooses q2 values of mi−1, computes q2 values of (h′i−1, g′i−1) from (mi−1, hi−2, gi−2).
The attack succeeds if some (hi−1, gi−1) and some (h′i−1, g
′
i−1) are matched. Since the quantities in the
meet-in-the-middle attack are 2n-bit long, the successful probability Pr[Pre] equals
Pr[Pre] = (1− q1
22n
) · (1− q1
22n − 1) · · · (1−
q1
22n − q2 )
≥ (1− q1
22n − q2 )
q2 .
(10)
The complexity of the above attack is the larger value between 2n×q1 and q2. For a non-negligible probability
in the lowest complexity, it follows that {
2n × q1 = q2,
q1 × q2 = 22n − q2. (11)
Consequently, it holds that q1 ≈ 2n/2 and q2 ≈ 23n/2, then the probability
Pr[Pre] ≥ (1− 2
n/2
22n − 23n/2 )
23n/2
≈ 1− e−1 ≈ 0.39.
(12)
It is easy to see that both the forward step and the backward step require 2× 23n/2 operations. Thus the total
complexity of the attack is 4× 23n/2. We note that a second preimage attack can be constructed by using the same
method. So the theorem holds. ¤
Similar to HDBL-1, a (second) preimage attack can be found in the HDBL-2 hash function as well. The attack
is described in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Let HDBL-2 be a hash function defined by the form (8),{
hi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ gi−1,
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(gi−1)⊕ hi−1.
then there exists a (second) preimage attack on the hash function with complexity of about 4× 23n/2.
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Proof. A (second) preimage attack on the HDBL-2 hash function proceeds as follows.
1. For the preimage attack on (hi, gi), A chooses arbitrary message M = m1||m2|| · · · ||mi−2, and by comput-
ing the values of (hi−2, gi−2) iteratively from the initial value IV = h0||g0.
2. Forward step:
(a) A randomly chooses 2n values of (mi,1,mi,2, hi−1), then computes 2n values of gi−1 where gi−1 =
Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi.
(b) A repeats the above step 2n/2 times. Due to the pigeonhole principle, A obtains 2n/2 values of
(mi, hi−1, gi−1) yield the fixed value (hi, gi).
3. Backward step: A chooses 23n/2 values ofmi−1, then computes 23n/2 values of (h′i−1, g′i−1) from (mi−1, hi−2, gi−2).
The attack succeeds if some (hi−1, gi−1) and some (h′i−1, g
′
i−1) are matched. Since the quantities in the
meet-in-the-middle attack are 2n-bit long, same to the equations (10),(11) and (12) in the attack of HDBL-1, the
successful probability Pr[Pre] equals 0.39 as well. Consequently, the complexity of the (second) preimage attack
is also about 4× 23n/2. So the theorem holds. ¤
Since HDBL-1 and HDBL-2 satisfy Type 2 and Type 1 in Definition 4, respectively, which are the two nec-
essary conditions defined by Hirose in [8]. The above attacks disclose the point that maybe there exist uncovered
flaws in the former security results on the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II which are given by Satoh et al. [25] and
Hirose [8]. Heuristically, we present three counter-examples, which do not satisfy Hirose’s necessary conditions
but still no efficient collision attack can be found, to support this considerable point.
First we give two examples of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II, which do not satisfy Type 2 condition
that c⊕ d = λ1a⊕ λ2b and y ⊕ z = λ3w ⊕ λ4x, for some λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 ∈ {0, 1}.
Example 1: {
hi = Emi,1⊕mi,2⊕hi−1||mi,2⊕gi−1(mi,1 ⊕ hi−1)⊕mi,2 ⊕ gi−1
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi−1
(13)
Example 2: {
hi = Emi,1⊕mi,2⊕hi−1||mi,2⊕gi−1(mi,1 ⊕mi,2 ⊕ hi−1)⊕mi,1 ⊕ hi−1
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi−1
(14)
The third example does not satisfy Type 2 condition that the upper right 2×2 submatrices of L and R are both
non-singular.
Example 3: {
hi = Emi,1||hi−1(mi,2 ⊕ gi−1)⊕mi,2 ⊕ gi−1
gi = Emi,1||mi,2(hi−1)⊕ hi−1
(15)
Based on the synthetic analysis of block-cipher-based hash functions [4, 7], here we present the indifferentia-
bility analysis on two typical examples in FDBL-II. Let distinguisher D can access to two cryptosystems (O1,O2)
where O1 = (H,E,E−1) and O2 = (Rand, S, S−1). Let ri ← ((hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)) be the i-th query-
response to the oracles {E,E−1, S, S−1} where mi ∈ {0, 1}2n. Ri = (r1, · · · , ri) denotes the query-response set
on the oracles {E,E−1, S, S−1} after the i-th query. Let r′i ← (IV
Mi−→ (hi, gi)) be the i-th query-response to the
oracles {H,Rand}, where Mi ∈M. R′i = (r′1, · · · , r′i) denotes the query-response set on the oracles {H,Rand}
after the i-th query. The algorithm Pad(·) denotes the indifferentiable padding rules, e.g., the prefix-free padding,
HMAC/NMAC and the chop construction, which were analyzed in [5]. For brevity, we note that all of the examples
are implicitly implemented with one of those padding rules. First we give the following theorem which establishes
the indifferentiability of Example 1.
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Theorem 6 The rate-1 hash function defined by (13) is (tD, tS , q, ²)-indifferentiable from a random oracle in the
ideal cipher model with the prefix-free padding, the NMAC/HMAC, and the chop construction, for any distinguisher
D in polynomial time bound tD, with tS = 2l ·O(q) and the advantage ² = 2−n+2 · l ·O(q), where l is the maximum
length of a query made by D and l · q ≤ 2n−1.
Proof. First we give a simulation to prove that Example 1 (defined in Section 3.1) is indifferentiable from a random
oracle.
• Rand-Query. For the i-th query Mi ∈ M on Rand, if Mi is a repetition query, the simulator S retrieves
r′j ← (IV
Mi−→ (hj , gj)) where rj ∈ R′i−1, j ≤ i − 1, then returns Rand(Mi) = (hj , gj). Else S
randomly selects a hash value (hi, gi) ∈ Y and updates R′i = R′i−1 ∪ {IV
Mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns
Rand(Mi) = (hi, gi).
• {S, S−1}-Query. To answer the distinguisher D’s encryption and decryption queries, the simulator S pro-
ceeds as follows.
1. For the i-th query (1, ki, xi) on S:
(a) If ∃IV M−→ (hi−1, gi−1) ∈ R′i−1, S computes Pad(M) = mi = mi,1||mi,2. And then,
i. if ki = mi,1 ⊕ mi,2 ⊕ hi−1||mi,2 ⊕ gi−1 and xi = mi,1 ⊕ hi−1, S runs Rand(M) and
obtains the response (hi, gi), updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns
yi = hi ⊕ ki,2;
ii. if ki = mi,1||mi,2 and xi = hi−1, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi), and
updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns yi = gi ⊕ xi.
(b) Else S randomly selects (hi, gi, hi−1, gi−1), computes mi,2 = ki,2⊕gi−1 and mi,1 = ki,1⊕mi,2⊕
hi−1, then adds the tuple (1, k′i, x
′
i, y
′
i) as x
′
i = hi−1, y
′
i = gi⊕xi and k′i = mi,1||mi,2, and updates
Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns yi = hi ⊕mi,2 ⊕ gi−1.
2. For the i-th query (−1, ki, yi) on S−1:
(a) If ∃IV M−→ (hi−1, gi−1) ∈ R′i−1, S computes Pad(M) = mi = mi,1||mi,2. And then,
i. if ki = mi,1 ⊕mi,2 ⊕ hi−1||mi,2 ⊕ gi−1, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi).
And then, if yi = hi ⊕mi,2 ⊕ gi−1, S updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)} and
returns xi = mi,1 ⊕ hi−1;
ii. if ki = mi,1||mi,2, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi). And then, if yi =
gi ⊕ hi−1, S updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)} and returns xi = hi−1.
(b) Else S randomly selects (gi, hi−1, gi−1), computes hi = yi ⊕ ki,2, mi,2 = ki,2 ⊕ gi−1 and mi,1 =
ki,1⊕mi,2⊕hi−1, then adds the tuple (1, k′i, x′i, y′i) as x′i = hi−1, y′i = gi⊕xi and k′i = mi,1||mi,2,
and updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns xi = hi ⊕mi,2 ⊕ gi−1.
Before stating the indifferentiability result of Example 1, the probability of the indifferentiable events on
Example 1 can be obtained from the above simulation.
Lemma 1 In double block length hash functions with the form (13), it holds that Pr[Pre] = 2−(3n+4)/2 · l · O(q)
and Pr[Coll] = 2−n+1 · l ·O(q), where l is the maximum number of length in a hash query.
Proof. In case of O2 = (Rand, S, S−1), the total number of choices is l · q, where l is the maximum number of
length in a hash query. For every 2 ≤ j ≤ l · q, let Collj be the collision event that a pair of inputs yield a same
output after the j-th queries. Namely, for some j′ < j, it follows that
(hj , gj) = (hj′ , gj′) or hj = gj ,
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which is equivalent to
(yj ⊕ kj,2, y′j ⊕ x′j) = (yj′ ⊕ kj′,2, y′j′ ⊕ x′j′) or (yj ⊕ kj,2 = y′j ⊕ x′j).
Since (hi, gi), where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l · q}, is randomly and uniformly selected by the simulator S in the range
{0, 1}n, the probability that the above event happens after the j-th queries is as follows.
Pr[Collj ] ≤ (j − 1)(2n − (j − 1)) · (2n − (j − 1)) +
1
2n
.
Let Coll be the collision event that a pair of inputs yield a same output after the maximum q times queries.
Thus, if l · q ≤ 2n−1,
Pr[Coll] = Pr[Coll1 ∨ Coll2 ∨ · · · ∨ Colll·q] ≤
l·q∑
j=2
Pr[Collj ]
≤
l·q∑
j=2
(
j − 1
(2n − (j − 1)) · (2n − (j − 1)) +
1
2n
)
≤
∑l·q
j=2(j − 1)
(2n − 2n−1) · (2n − 2n−1) +
l · q
2n
≤ (1 + l · q) · (l · q)
22n−1
+
l · q
2n
≤ 2
n−1(l · q) + (l · q) + 2n−1(l · q)
22n−1
≈ l · q
2n−1
(16)
From the preimage attack on FDBL-II in Theorem 10, it is easy to see the probability of the preimage events
Pre is
Pr[Pre] = Pr[Pre1 ∨ Pre2 ∨ · · · ∨ Prel·q] ≤
l·q∑
j=1
Pr[Prej ]
≤
l·q∑
j=1
(
1
4× 23n/2 ) ≤
l · q
4× 23n/2
(17)
Consequently, the probability of the indifferentiable events Bad is
Pr[Bad] = 2×Max(Pr[Coll],Pr[Pre]) = 2× Pr[Coll] = 2−n+2 · l ·O(q).
By implementing the advantage of indifferentiability in keyed hash function[7], similar results can be easily
deduced in keyed mode. So the theorem follows. ¤
The following theorem establishes the indifferentiability of HDBL-1. The omitted proof can be found in
Appendix A. Based on the indifferentiability analysis, one can find that both Example 1 and HDBL-1 are optimally
collision resistant in the ideal cipher model. By using the similar analysis, the proofs can be extended to other
examples.
Theorem 7 The rate-1 hash function defined by (6) is (tD, tS , q, ²)-indifferentiable from a random oracle in the
ideal cipher model with the prefix-free padding, the NMAC/HMAC, and the chop construction, for any distinguisher
D in polynomial time bound tD, with tS = 2l ·O(q) and the advantage ² = 2−n+2 · l ·O(q), where l is the maximum
length of a query made by D and l · q ≤ 2n−1.
From the above concrete attacks and the counter-examples, it is easy to see that Hirose’s two necessary condi-
tions (at least) are still not precise for the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally secure against preimage,
second preimage and collision attacks. A more rigorous analysis is required to discover the certain conditions
which should be imposed on FDBL-II for the property of the optimal security.
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3.2 The Exact Security of FDBL-II
In [8], a comment is shown that the attacks given by Satoh et al. [25] do not work on some hash functions in
FDBL-II, as is expected even the underlying compression function unlikely satisfies the exceptional property. E.g.,
HDBL-1 is a counter-example that supports this comment. Due to the three counter-examples which are described
in Section 3.1, Hirose’s conditions [8] become inaccurate as well. Moreover, Since HDBL-2 is an instance of
FDBL-II with the exceptional property, the two concrete attacks on HDBL-1 and HDBL-2 show the fact that the
result given by Satoh et al. [25] can not imply the optimal security. The exact security of the rate-1 hash functions
in FDBL-II is reconsidered through the following attacks. First generic attacks are presented.
Theorem 8 For any rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II with the form (3), if T operations are required to find a block
mi = mi,1||mi,2 for any given value of (hi−1, gi−1), such that the resulting four-tuple (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2)
yields the fixed value for hi(or gi or hi ⊕ gi), then there exist collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks on
the hash function with complexities of about (T + 3)× 2n/2, (T + 3)× 2n, and (T + 3)× 2n, respectively.
Proof. An adversary A starts the attacks by choosing an arbitrary message M = m1||m2|| · · · ||mi−2, and by
computing the values of (hi−2, gi−2) iteratively from the initial value IV = h0||g0. The initial operations for the
values of (hi−2, gi−2) can be ignored if i¿ 2n/2.
For (second) preimage attacks, A searches for two blocks mi−1 and mi such that the fixed hash value (hi, gi)
is hit. First, A computes the pair (hi−1, gi−1) from the given values (hi−2, gi−2) and (mi−1,1,mi−1,2). Next, A
finds a block (mi,1,mi,2) such that the resulting four-tuple (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2) yields the fixed value for hi(or
gi or hi ⊕ gi). This step costs T times of encryption or decryption. Finally, A computes the value of gi(or hi) from
the tuple (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2). If the value is not hit, A will repeat the above steps at most 2n times. Due to
the pigeonhole principle, the probability of finding the (second) preimage in the above procedure is non-negligible.
The total complexity of these (second) preimage attacks is about (T + 3)× 2n.
For collision attacks, A searches for a pair of the blocks (mi−1,mi) and (m′i−1,m′i) yields the same hash
value (hi, gi). First, A chooses a value of hi. Then A proceeds 2n/2 times in the same way as the preimage attack.
Due to the birthday paradox, the probability of finding the collision in the above procedure is non-negligible. The
total complexity of these collision attacks is about (T + 3)× 2n/2. So the theorem holds. ¤
Subsequently, the attacks that simultaneously break the optimal collision and the (second) preimage resis-
tances are described as follows.
Lemma 2 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-II with the form (3), if the rank of L(or R) is less than three,
then there exist collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks on the hash function with complexities of about
4× 2n/2, 3× 2n, and 3× 2n, respectively.
Proof. Consider the general form of FDBL-II. Since the rank of L (or R) is at most two and hi (or gi) depends
on a subspace of (mi,1,mi,2, hi−1, gi−1), it follows that an adversary has at least one dimensional of freedom to
find the values of mi,1(or mi,2 or mi,1⊕mi,2) yields the given hash value (hi, gi). Based on the attacks defined by
Theorem 8, it is easy to prove that T ' 0 in the (second) preimage attack, and T ' 1 in the collision attack. So the
lemma holds. ¤
Lemma 3 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-II with the form (3), if the rank of L3r(or L4r or R3r or R4r) is less
than two, then there exist collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks on the hash function with complexities
of about 4× 2n/2, 3× 2n, and 3× 2n, respectively.
Proof. Consider the general form of FDBL-II. If either the rank of L3r or L4r is less than two, then the key A||B of
EA||B(C) (or E−1A||B(hi ⊕D)) depends on one dimensional of (mi,1,mi,2)(or mi,1 ⊕mi,2). Let (a, b, c, d) be the
values of (A,B,C,D) used in the computations of hi. By computing d = Ea||b(c)⊕hi (in case of Rank(L4r) < 2)
or c = E−1a||b(d⊕ hi) (in case of Rank(L3r) < 2), an adversary can decide the value of mi,1(or mi,2) from the hash
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values of (hi−1, gi−1, hi, gi). Based on the attacks in Theorem 8, it is easy to prove that T ' 0 in the (second)
preimage attack, and T ' 1 in the collision attack. Same result holds if either the rank of R3r or R4r is less than
two. ¤
Furthermore, the attacks that just break the property of the optimal collision or (second) preimage resistance
are described as follows.
Theorem 9 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-II with the form (3), if both the second column of L and the first
column of R are zero column vectors, then there exists a collision attack on the hash function with complexity of
about O(n · 2n/2).
Proof. Consider the general form of FDBL-II. Because the second column of L and the first column of R are zero
column vectors, so hi does not depend on gi−1 and gi does not depend on hi−1 in mutual. It is easy to see the hash
value (hi, gi) is simply computed from a concatenation of two separate hash functions. Due to Joux’s multicollision
attack[11], we can find 2n/2 different messages yield the same hash value hi with complexity of about O(n · 2n/2),
which implies at least one pair of messages yield the same hash value gi with a non-negligible probability. So the
theorem follows. ¤
Theorem 10 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-II with the form (3), there exists a (second) preimage attack
on the hash function with complexity of about 4× 23n/2.
Proof. Consider the general form of FDBL-II. Let (a, b, c, d) be the values of (A,B,C,D) used in the computations
of hi. If the rank of L or R is less than three, then the result follows from Lemma 1; If the rank of L or R is greater
or equal three, adversary A start the attacks by choosing an arbitrary messages M = m1||m2|| · · · ||mi−2, and by
computing the values of (hi−2, gi−2) iteratively from the given initial value IV = h0||g0.
1. Forward step: A randomly chooses 2n values of (a, b, c). If the rank of L is three (assume d is a linear
combination of a, b, c), then A obtains a tuple (a, b, c) yields the given value hi = Ea||b(c) ⊕ c; If the rank
of L is four, then A computes 2n values of d where d = Ea||b(c) ⊕ hi. Due to the pigeonhole principle, A
can find at least one tuple (hi−1, gi−1,mi) from (a, b, c, d) that satisfies the equation.
2. A repeats the above step 2n/2 times. Due to the pigeonhole principle,A obtains 2n/2 values of (mi, hi−1, gi−1)
yield the fixed value (hi, gi).
3. Backward step: A chooses 23n/2 values ofmi−1, then computes 23n/2 values of (h′i−1, g′i−1) from (mi−1, hi−2, gi−2).
It is easy to see the attack will succeed with a non-negligible probability due to the equation (12). The total
complexity is about 4× 23n/2. So the theorem follows. ¤
We stress that both HDBL-1 and HDBL-2 are failed to be optimally (second) preimage resistance due to
Theorem 10. The complexity of the generic second preimage attack, which was proposed by Kelsey and Schneier
in [12], can be asymptotically smaller than ours. But their attack needs unpractical long message, which makes it
become less attractive. E.g., for 2n-bit hash functions, a 2x-bit long message with about x×2n+1+22n−x+1 work.
It is easy to see that a second preimage attack with the complexity of about O(23n/2) requires a 2n/2-bit message.
Based on the above results, necessary conditions for the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II to be optimally
secure are refined as follows. It is easy to see that the same result similarly follows in the serial situation of
FDBL-II.
Corollary 1 For any rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II, if the compression function matches one of the following
two conditions:
1. The ranks of L or R is less than three;
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2. The rank of L3r(or L
4
r or R
3
r or R
4
r) is less than two,
then there exist collision , preimage and second preimage preimage attacks with a non-negligible successful prob-
ability must spend the complexities of about O(2n/2), O(2n) and O(2n), respectively. Furthermore, if both the
second column of L and the first column of R are zero column vertexes, then there exists a collision attack on the
hash function with complexity of about O(n · 2n/2). For all of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II, there exist
preimage and second preimage attacks with a non-negligible successful probability must spend the same complexity
of about O(23n/2).
Based on the attacks on FDBL-I and FDBL-II, a fully negative result is extended to a new class of DBL hash
functions with rate 1 (FDBL-III), where one block cipher has the key length equal to the block length, while the
other is doubled. For the length restriction, details can be found in Appendix B.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of FDBL-II has been reconsidered and the necessary conditions for optimally collision
resistant are refined. It is proven that all of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-II are failed to be optimally (second)
preimage resistant. Moreover, the indifferentiability analysis supported that there exist paradigms in FDBL-II
which can be indifferentiable from a random oracle in the ideal cipher model, and implies they are optimally
collision resistant. These cryptanalysis results give a complete view to the rate-1 DBL hash functions based on
existed block ciphers, which are helpful for the design of secure and fast DBL hash functions. In practice, AES
algorithm can be simply implemented in hardware circuits, i.e., a fully AES-based cryptosystem on chip (uses AES
as block cipher, while uses the proposed schemes as hash function) is meaningful.
Due to the key length will definitely impact the efficiency, e.g., AES encrypts 20% slower for 192-bit keys
and 40% slower for 256-bit keys. The definition of the hash rate is not appropriate for the new designs of double
block (or multi-block) length hash functions. Generally, a rate-1 DBL hash function in FDBL-I cannot directly
compare to such one in FDBL-II. To solve this inaccuracy, a new preferable concept should be defined instead of
the hash rate for the measurement of the efficiency. In FSE 2008, Knudsen roughly presented a new definition on
the hash rate, which takes into account the key schedule and the block length as well [15]. We think Knudsen’s new
definition is still not appropriate, since the key length is ignored. E.g., the rates of hash functions, which are based
on different block ciphers with different key lengths but same key schedules and block lengths, will apparently be
inequivalent. Future work is to summarize a generic proof on block-cipher-based hash functions with variants of
block and key length through a preferable definition on the hash rate.
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A. Proof of Theorem 7
Here we give an indifferentiability analysis on HDBL-1 (described in Section 2.3), which is a typical rate-1 hash
functions in FDBL-II as well.
• Rand-Query. For the i-th Rand-query Mi ∈ M, if Mi is a repetition query, the simulator S retrieves
r′j ← (IV
Mi−→ (hj , gj)) where rj ∈ R′i−1, j ≤ i − 1, then returns Rand(Mi) = (hj , gj). Else S
randomly selects a hash value (hi, gi) ∈ Y and updates R′i = R′i−1 ∪ {IV
Mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns
Rand(Mi) = (hi, gi).
• {S, S−1}-Query. To answer the distinguisher D’s encryption and decryption queries, the simulator S pro-
ceeds as follows.
1. For the i-th query (1, ki, xi) on S:
(a) If ∃IV M−→ (hi−1, gi−1) ∈ R′i−1, S computes Pad(M) = mi = mi,1||mi,2. And then,
i. if ki = mi,1||mi,2 and xi = hi−1 ⊕ gi−1, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi),
updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns yi = hi ⊕ xi;
ii. if ki = mi,1||mi,2 and xi = hi−1, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi), and
updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns yi = hi ⊕ xi.
(b) Else S randomly selects (hi, gi, gi−1), computes mi,1 = ki,1, mi,2 = ki,2 and hi−1 = xi ⊕ gi−1,
then adds the tuple (1, k′i, x
′
i, y
′
i) as x
′
i = gi−1, y
′
i = gi ⊕ x′i ⊕ hi−1 and k′i = ki, and updates
Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns yi = hi ⊕ xi.
2. For the i-th query (−1, ki, yi) on S−1:
(a) If ∃IV M−→ (hi−1, gi−1) ∈ R′i−1, S computes Pad(M) = mi = mi,1||mi,2. And then,
i. if ki = mi,1||mi,2, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi). And then, if yi = hi⊕
hi−1⊕gi−1, S updatesRi = Ri−1∪{(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)} and returns xi = hi−1⊕gi−1;
ii. if ki = mi,1||mi,2, S runs Rand(M) and obtains the response (hi, gi). And then, if yi =
gi ⊕ hi−1, S updates Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)} and returns xi = hi−1.
(b) Else S randomly selects (gi, hi−1, gi−1), computes hi = yi ⊕ gi−1, mi,1 = ki,1 and mi,2 = ki,2,
then adds the tuple (1, k′i, x
′
i, y
′
i) as x
′
i = gi−1, y
′
i = gi ⊕ x′i ⊕ hi−1 and k′i = ki, and updates
Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(hi−1, gi−1) mi−→ (hi, gi)}, then returns xi = hi−1 ⊕ gi−1.
Before stating the indifferentiability result of HDBL-1, a simple lemma is proven from the above simulation.
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Lemma 4 In double block length hash functions defined by (6), it holds that Pr[Pre] = 2−(3n+4)/2 · l · O(q) and
Pr[Coll] = 2−n+2 · l ·O(q), where l is the maximum number of length in a hash query.
Proof. In case of O2 = (Rand, S, S−1), the total number of choices is l · q, where l is the maximum number of
length in a hash query. For every 2 ≤ j ≤ l · q, let Collj be the collision event that a pair of inputs yield a same
output after the j-th queries. Namely, for some j′ < j, it follows that
(hj , gj) = (hj′ , gj′) or hj = gj ,
which is equivalent to
(yj ⊕ xj , y′j ⊕ x′j) = (yj′ ⊕ xj′ , y′j′ ⊕ x′j′) or (yj ⊕ xj = y′j ⊕ x′j).
Since (hi, gi), where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l · q} is randomly and uniformly selected by the simulator S in the range
{0, 1}n, the probability that the above event happens after the j-th queries is as follows.
Pr(Collj) ≤ (j − 1)(2n − (j − 1)) · (2n − (j − 1)) +
1
2n
.
Let Coll be the collision event that a pair of inputs yield a same output after the maximum q times queries.
By implementing the same idea on the proof of Example 1, if l · q ≤ 2n−1, it is easy to find that Pr[Coll] ≤ l·q
2n−1 .
Similarly, the probability of the preimage event Pre is Pr[Pre] ≤ l·q
2(3n+4)/2
.
Consequently, the probability of the indifferentiable events Bad is
Pr[Bad] = 2×Max(Pr[Coll],Pr[Pre]) = 2× Pr[Coll] = 2−n+2 · l ·O(q).
By implementing the advantage of indifferentiability in keyed hash function[7], similar results can be easily
deduced in keyed mode. ¤
From the above analysis, Theorem 7 follows on HDBL-1. We believe many of the rate-1 hash functions in
FDBL-II, which obey Corollary 1, can be indifferentiable from a random oracle in the ideal cipher model. Further-
more, if both the rank of L and R are three, the indifferentiability analysis implies a formal proof in the ideal cipher
model, since the simulator S can simulate the response of the encryption and decryption from the query (ki, xi)
and (ki, yi), respectively.
B. A New Class of Fast DBL Hash Functions
Based on FDBL-I and FDBL-II, a new class of fast DBL hash functions named FDBL-III can be defined as follows.
Hash functions in FDBL-III can be constructed on a block cipherE ∈ Bloc(κ, n) with variants of key length where
κ = n or κ = 2n.
Definition 5 Let E ∈ Bloc(κ, n) be a block cipher with variants of key length where κ = n or κ = 2n. A new
class of DBL hash functions with rate 1 (denoted by FDBL-III) can be constructed as follows.{
hi = EA(B)⊕ C,
gi = EW ||X(Y )⊕ Z. (18)
Both (A,B,C) and (W,X, Y, Z) are linear combinations of the n-bit vectors (hi−1, gi−1,mi,1,mi,2). Those
linear combinations can be represented as
AB
C
 = (Ll Lr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
·

hi−1
gi−1
m1i
m2i
 ,

W
X
Y
Z
 = (Rl Rr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
·

hi−1
gi−1
m1i
m2i
 , (19)
By implementing the similar attacks on FDBL-I and FDBL-II, one can easily derive the following attacks on
FDBL-III.
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Lemma 5 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-III with the form (18), if the rank of L(or R) is less than three,
then there exist collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks on the hash function with complexities of about
4× 2n/2, 3× 2n, and 3× 2n, respectively.
Lemma 6 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-III with the form (18), if the rank of L2r(or L3r or R3r or R4r) is less
than two, then there exist collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks on the hash function with complexities
of about 4× 2n/2, 3× 2n, and 3× 2n, respectively.
Lemma 7 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-III with the form (18), there exist free-start collision and free-start
(second) preimage attacks on the hash function with complexities of about 2× 2n/2 and 2× 2n, respectively.
The above lemmas are extended from the similar attacks on FDBL-II, so we omitted the proofs here. In
particular, based on Knudsen et al. result on FDBL-I [14], it is easy to obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 8 For any rate-1 hash function in FDBL-III with the form (18), then there exist (second) preimage attacks
on the hash function with the complexity of about 4× 2n. Furthermore, if the rank of L2l and L3l are two, then there
exists a collision attack on the hash function with complexity of about 3× 23n/4, else there exists a collision attack
with complexity of about 4× 2n/2.
Consequently, the following corollary gives upper bounds of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-III. From the
bounds, one can see all of the rate-1 hash functions in FDBL-III are failed to be optimally secure against collision,
second preimage and preimage attacks. Same result can be obtained in the serial mode of FDBL-III.
Corollary 2 For any rate-1 hash function H in FDBL-III with the form (18), there exist collision, preimage and
second preimage attacks on the hash function with complexities of about O(23n/4), O(2n) and O(2n), respectively.
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